WestCoastJoe wrote: ↑Thu May 24, 2018 2:35 am
From Lowell Ullrich ...
“He has a good structure in the way he does things,” Jennings said of Jackson. “We’re going to utilize my strengths with (run-pass option) stuff like a lot of teams do but there’s going to be a good balance.”
“Without being too critical or comparing (to Jones), the one thing with Jarious is that it just look likes there’s a lot more motion and misdirection,” said coach Wally Buono.
“You don’t want to get too far ahead but you can see the play-action more, the quarterback is moving more, and you can see the ability to get the ball in the hands of playmakers.”
Or, with Joel Figueroa and Jovan Olafioye as replacement tackles and a much beefier David Foucault looking comfortable early at right guard, the Lions might simply be better because the quarterback won’t have to constantly consider running to safe his football life. Influences and statistics be damned.
That is how this fan sees it.
Protect your quarterback. Playbook. Game plans. Play calls. Personnel. Pass protection. Execution.
Attack the opposing quarterback. Glad to hear Odell Willis is looking good. He has had many very productive years in the CFL. He might have something left in the tank. Conservative defence, however, is not about attacking the quarterback. We will see ...
Our Leos had our best offensive structure in 2011 and 2012, when Chap used much more misdirection and motion, as well as moving our receivers around to take advantage of mismatches.
This is a welcome change in offensive direction for 2018 by Jarious Jackson. He is going to add more West Coast to the spread, as well as motion, misdirection, and moving receivers around. His offence will attempt to challenge defenses, both horitzontally and vertically, attempting to stretch the field in all directions.
Even more importantly, Jarious wants to introduce more run/pass option plays, more play action, and the quarterback getting the football out of his hands quicker.
For too long in B.C. we've been an inside zone read run offence and a pocket passing slot oriented offence with a very predictable scheme. Its also been a plug and play offence that has not taken advantage of our personnel.
For example, its been rare that we took advantage of mobile quarterbacks like Casey Printers, Buck Pierce, Travis Lulay, and Jonathan Jennnings. When we had a quarterback lke Dave Dickenson, then a pure pocket passing spread offence made more sense. But confining mobile quarterbacks like Casey Printers, Buck Pierce, Travis Lulay, and Jonathan Jennings to the pocket rather than using more play action, semi-sprint outs, quarter and half-rolls meant that we didn't create duel threat situations to put more pressure on the defense.
Sure, Printers, Pierce, Lulay, and Jennings took off and ran the football but that was mostly based on necessity, with the pocket breaking down, rather than beng part of a design to get the quarterback outside, where he had a run/pass option.
The only time we actually designed our offence, at times, to take advantage of a mobile quarterback was in 2011 and 2012. One play call during those two seasons provides an example of what a difference maker challenging the edge could be. After setting the play up, Lulay would fake the inside zone read handoff to Harris, fake the fly sweep, and bootleg right, with a run pass option. Gore would clear out the wide side with a fly pattern, Bruce would run a corner route, Simon would be coming across on an intermediate crossing route, and Harris, after his fake into the line, would find a hole in the zone on the right side.
Lulay, running right, had the option to throw to Bruce, Simon, or Harris. Most of the time, he would find Harris wide open and often Lulay would run the football himself. The play put the outside linebacker on an island. If he covered Harris, Lulay would run. If he came up on Lulay, Lulay would hit Harris, as he did in the 2011 Grey Cup game. Often, Lulay found himself in a position where Harris was open and he also had open field in front of him. The play was set up with motion and misdirection.
But its not only the quarterback position that our old pocket passing spread offence created problems for. The offensive line had to pass block continuously for a pocket passing quarterback who was a stationary target in the pocket. The slotbacks waggled to the line of scrimage and defenses, knowing our penchant for being a slot oriented offence, could double one or both. It made us much easier to defend.
To make matters worse, we ran crossing patterns against zone defense, setting up our slotbacks for hellacious hits. We ran zone patterns against man, rather than use crossing patterns, pick plays, or bunch formations with combination routes to create confusion or bump off defenders. In other words, it didn't matter whether the defense was in man or zone, we ran the play that was called and the play that was called had nothing to do with what the defense was doing.
In other words, it was called 'execution' and we attempted to execute plays regardless of defensive strategies or our own offensive personnel.
No wonder players like Jason Jiminez, Dean Valli, or Andrew Harris were outspoken in their frustration. But most players, as expected, were loyal soldiers who just repeated the mantra of Wally that they just had to 'execute better'.
A good example of the difficulty of pass blocking for our offensive system was in 2005 and 2006. We won the West in 2005 and won a Grey Cup in 2006, while giving up the most quarterback pressures and most quarterback sacks in both seasons. In 2006, we had an outstanding offensive line, with Murphy and Jiminez at tackle, Reid at center, and Rasouli and Bates at guard but we couldn't protect Dickenson. Against a 6th place defense, in the 2006 Grey Cup game, Dickenson was only able to pass for 184 yards as our predictable passing game was defensed well in a playoff game, a theme that has played out often. Calgary shut down our offence in the first half of the 2016 West Final, going into the second half with a 32-0 half time lead.
Another good example of this type of offensive thinking has been our use of Chris Rainey, whenever he entered the game. It was easy to predict that Rainey would be given the football and it would take place with two plays 1) the inside read option and 2) the quick swing pass.
Defenses were prepared for Rainey entering a game in 2017. His run average dropped from 8.6 yds. per carry to 4.2 yds. per carry. Calgary's defense was already very well prepared for Rainey in the pass game in the 2016 West Final. They lined up in press man and nailed Rainey for losses on almost every swing pass.
Did we learn anything? Nope. We kept using Rainey in the same ways in 2017, rather than have him also attack the edge in the run game or isolate him against a linebacker in space in the pass game.
What excites me about 2018 is the potential of a change in offensive direction and philosophy. Ed Hervey has done a great job of taking an offensive line with the two worst offensive tackles in the league in 2017 and given it talent with Figueroa and Olifioye. But we had two excellent offensive tackles in Murphy and Jiminez in 2006 and we coldn't protect our quarterback. A new offensive scheme, with quicker passing and more motion and misdirection, will help not only our offensive line but also our quarterbacks, running backs, and receivers.
A lot has been said about Jonathan Jennings play in 2017. But Jennings play last season followed a familiar pattern of our quarterback's play in the Buono era. Quarterbacks as Casey Printers, Buck Pierce, Jarious Jackson, and Travis Lulay began their careers as Leo starters with excellent results. But constant pressure, sacks, and injuries would soon take a toll and the downward slide would begin.
Jonathan Jennings started the last 6 games of 2016 as a rookie and played impressively, with a 99.8 quarterback average. In his first full season as a starter in 2017, Jennings had an excellent 102.1 quarterback efficiency average. But in 2018, constant pressure, sacks, injuries resulted in a season in which Jennings quarterback average plummeted to 83.8 and he threw more inteceptions than touchdown passes.
I read the same refrains on Lionbackers that I read about Casey Printers, Buck Pierce, Jarious Jackson, and Travis Lulay, when after early success, their quarterback play seemed to deteriorate. The reality is that all these quarterbacks played more naturally earlier in their careers as Leo quarterbacks but the longer they played in the Buono imposed spread system, being forced to stay in the pocket and 'execute' the worse they played.
For example, Casey Printers quarteback efficiency average went from 115.0 in 2004 to 87.2 in 2005. In his return to our Leos, Printers had a 99.3 quarterback average in 2009 to a 81.4 efficiency average in 2010, before his release. Buck Pierce had a 97.4 quarterback efficiency average in his first full season as our starter in 2008 but it dropped to 79.5 in 2009. In 2008, Pierce threw for 19 touchdowns, while only throwing 9 interceptions. In 2009, Pierce threw more interceptions than touchdown passes.
Jarious Jackson, in 2007, beginning the season as our third string quarterback and never having started a game as a Leo before, led us to 9 wins in his 11 games as a starter as we won the West with the best offence in the CFL. Jackson threw 18 touchdown passes against 10 inteceptions. But in 2009 and 2010, his play deteriorated as his touchdown to interception ratio slid.
Travis Lulay entered the scene as our starter in 2011. His quarterback efficiency average in 2011 was 95.8 and in 2012 his quarterback efficiency average was 100.7. He had an outstanding touchdown to interception ratio. But as a starter in 2015, Lulay had a quarterback efficiency average of 84.4 and his touchdown to interception ratio had plummeted.
For those who believe that Lulay, based on his four games as as starter in 2017, was poised to 'stand and deliver' again, the pattern would have repeated itself if Lulay had remained in our old offensive system - early success followed by what would appear as 'deteriorating' quarterback play.
None of these quarterbacks suddenly fell off the turnip truck and couldn't read a defense anymore, after such early success. Nor can their deteriorating play, after establishing themselves as successful starters, be explained fully by the notion that defenses learned their tendencies.
The reality is that each of these quarterbacks became more robotic as they attempted to remain in the pocket, while under incredible pressure, while attempting to 'execute' a very predictable offence.
Travis Lulay played rarely in 2016. When he started four games in 2017, he looked fresh and his thinking was fresh again. On his first play, he faked the inside zone read and took off outside, just as he had done early in his career, rather than just handing the football off. Lulay was a duel threat quarterback again in 2017, as he had been early in his career. For example, in 2015, Lulay started 10 games and only ran the football 20 times. In only four starts in 2017, Lulay ran the football 31 times.
It was the Travis Lulay of old, with an even stronger arm. He looked natural and confident. But over time, the familiar pattern of our quarterback play would have returned. Early success would eventually lead to more robotic play rather than instinctual play as he confined himself more to the pocket and 'executed' the offence. The pressures and sacks and predictability of playing in that style of offence would lead to more interceptions, less confidence, and increased self-pressure.
Just watching Lulay in the huddle and his body language last season before he got injured reminded me of the Travis of old. But if one has observed our starting quarterbacks over time, they almost always looked more confident early in their careers, more relaxed, more poised and over time they looked less confident, more stressed, and less poised.
So, I am estatic we will be finally using a different offence this season. Anything will be better than our old offensife system that was tired, old, outdated, predictable, boring, and about as dynamic as watching paint dry.
One part of me is surprised that Wally is allowing a new offensive system and philosophy to be implemented. Wally has been an old dog for a long time now, with a penchant for rigidity. But not making the playoffs last season and desperate to go out a winner has likely had something to do with his new thinking. But I highly doubt that Wally just had an epiphany that has resulted in a massive paradign shift.
Likely Ed Hervey also talked to Wally about change, offering his insights as to how teams have defended our offence in the past. But perhaps there is another reason. Fearful personalities tend to be ultra-conservative, always wanting to feel safe in the familiar, resisting change, and always focusing on what could go wrong with change, rather than looking at what could go right with doing something different.
Buono finished last in the West in 2017. Its his last season. "What has he got to lose", as he said himself a few days ago. For a lot of reasons, the stars are aligned for a better football season in 2018. Last season, many analysts predicted our Leos would win the Grey Cup, based upon the talent we had at our skill positions. But poor offensive and defensive line play and predictable offenses and defenses, along with poor special return team play, turned that 2017 optomism into despair.
Wally World may have introduced a number of new rides this season. We now have the hope of seeing not only a new offence but Wally even gambling on third and one, rather than punting in the oppositions end of the field. We could even see a more aggressive defense. We may even see something new on special team return play, other than just running the football back up the middle on punts.
The anticipation almost boggles the mind of this long time Leos fan.
"When I went to Catholic high school in Philadelphia, we just had one coach for football and basketball. He took all of us who turned out and had us run through a forest. The ones who ran into the trees were on the football team". (George Raveling)
